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The Moral Agency of The State: What does a Virtuous State Look Like and is 
Allowing Capitalism Virtuous?  
By: Austin Cable 
 
Introduction 
 It has become quite noticeable that modern world politics across the globe has lacked a 
guiding morality in which we can hold states morally accountable in both the international and 
domestic spheres. This can be seen in the never-ending wars and occupations across the Middle 
East, South-East Asia, and many other places around the world. Now, attempting to implement 
such guiding moral principles seems to be an impossible task mainly because of the massive 
difficulties that one would face in trying to get the 195 countries around the world to agree on 
such principles. Because of this, most will probably accuse me of eurocentrism, which I hope to 
avoid in this paper.  Despite this fact, I believe that the inevitable effects of the Climate Crisis 
and the need to see basic human rights observed across the world is enough reason to at least 
discuss the question: How can we begin to hold collective agents, states specifically, accountable 
for their actions?  
 To begin a discussion on how to hold the state morally responsible, it seems necessary to 
look back at how philosophers have traditionally discussed the agency of the state and figure out 
what features must a state have to be able to say that it can be held morally responsible. This 
leads me to look at discussions about the “personhood” of the state and what it means to be a 
moral agent. I believe that there exists a difference between personhood and moral agency that 
will allow us to sidestep the difficulty of establishing the state as a person, and simply need to 
prove that it can be a moral agent. To do this I will briefly overview Quentin Skinner’s argument 
in his lecture “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State” to revive Thomas Hobbes’ 
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theory on “the artificial person of the state” and other modern conceptions of personhood. Along 
with this, I will look at a traditional view of what it is to be a moral agent set forth by Alasdair 
MacIntyre in his work, “Social Structures and Moral Agency”. Through this section, I will 
establish that we merely need to provide an argument that the state can be classified as a moral 
agent to be able to hold them morally responsible.  
 Once we have established the notion that the state needs moral agency for us to hold them 
morally responsible, we are then tasked with proving that the state is a moral agent. Like many 
who write about moral responsibilities of the state in the international sphere, I will be assuming 
a version of the agential theory that gives us an argument as to why we can give moral agency to 
collective entities, like the state, and hold them morally responsible for their action. Specifically, 
I will be using an argument given for collective moral responsibility by Phillip Pettit. Through 
this argument Pettit establishes conditions that must be met for a collective entity to hold moral 
responsibility. Though Pettit does not specifically talk about the state, I believe that the argument 
he lays out for collective entities as a whole can be used for the state, and I show this by breaking 
down the argument and analyzing how and why a state meets these same conditions. I will go 
into more detail about the argument later on, but through this argument, I want to take this 
concept of the collective moral agency of the state and apply it to the domestic sphere instead of 
the international sphere, where it is most commonly utilized. This will include deciphering what 
the state owes it citizens and how to decipher whether an action taken by the state, in the 
domestic sphere, is morally right or wrong. I believe that in doing this, we can lay the 
groundwork for holding states morally responsible for their actions, which I rarely see in the 
world anymore, and help craft the image of a morally just state.  
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 To start analyzing moral responsibilities of states and what a morally right or wrong state 
looks like, we must have a moral theory to use as the framework. While traditionally agential 
theory arguments have been ran through Kantian and Rights Based moral framework, I believe 
that the argument can better be laid out using a form of Virtue Ethics. By using Virtue Ethics, I 
believe we can achieve two things. First, we can create The Virtues of the State, which will 
resemble the virtues that already exist for moral agents, but will be specifically tied to actions 
that are uniquely made by states. This will provide us with basic moral principles that we can use 
to judge the moral status of a states’ action. Second, through these created virtues, we can form 
the image of what a Virtuous State would look like. This can be used by states as a moral 
exemplar to strive towards. Virtue Ethics is rarely used within the political philosophy and global 
justice spheres because it has been traditionally focused on an individual actor. However, I 
believe that by successfully establishing the agential theory of moral agency for collective 
entities, like states, we can talk about states in the same sense that we talk about individual moral 
actors within Virtue Ethics.    
 Finally, I will apply my theory to something that I believe needs to be addressed when 
talking about the morality of the state. I believe it is time to have a discussion about whether or 
not it is morally right for a state to implement and keep Capitalism as its economic system. To do 
this I will take the three virtues of the state that I analyze in this paper and see if the 
implementation of capitalism, specifically the theory of competition which capitalism relies so 
heavily upon, prevents the state from working towards these virtues. If it turns out to be true that 
capitalism is preventing states from being virtuous to its citizens, then I believe we have 
established a reason for states to abandon capitalism and look towards other economic systems 
that are more morally appliable. This may seem to fall in line with a lot of traditional critiques of 
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capitalism, however, I believe it differs in an important way, Through this exercise I hope to 
prove that the choice of the state is what the moral failure lies, not capitalism itself. I do this 
because I have heard many rebuttals to the traditional critique of capitalism, which calls it 
inherently immoral, that say it cannot be immoral or moral because economic systems are 
inherently amoral. While I may not completely agree with this rebuttal, I do feel it necessary to 
find a solution to it. That is why I believe we can prove that we can hold states morally 
accountable for their actions and choices, and through this show that the choice of capitalism is 
an immoral one.  
 The main objective of this paper is to provide an argument for not only holding collective 
entities like states morally accountable for their actions in the domestic sphere, but also for using 
a form of Virtue Ethics to accomplish it. The first section of this paper will be focused on the 
philosophical history of thinking of the state as a person and moral actor, and then establishing 
what classification is necessary for goals of this paper. Next, I will look to solidify the argument 
for agential theory and establishing reason as to why we need to be able to hold states morally 
responsible for their actions. Like I have already stated, I will be using an argument traditionally 
used in international discussions, and simply applying it to the domestic sphere. Then, in the next 
section I will spend time analyzing what would come from using a Virtue Ethics approach. I 
hope to come up with a “starter set” of the virtues of the state and show examples of how 
decisions made by states can be assessed by using these virtues. Along with that, I will create a 
rough image of what a virtuous state would look like in modern times. Finally, I will apply my 
theory to the question: Is the choice of Capitalism an Immoral one? By the end of this paper, I 
hope to have shown a successful argument as to why states should be held morally accountable 
for their actions in the domestic sphere and how we should go about holding them accountable.  
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The Personhood of the State vs. The State as a Moral Agent 
 The initial thought of holding the state morally responsible for its actions may at first 
seem counterintuitive to some because traditional moral and political theory has not viewed the 
state as a moral actor in and of itself. If the state is not a moral actor, it therefore has no actions 
that can be judged through a moral framework. However, some theorist throughout political 
philosophy have went against the traditional view and crafted arguments that say otherwise. The 
most prominent argument of this nature comes from a political philosopher who is read widely 
amongst students of philosophy, Thomas Hobbes. In Leviathan Hobbes not only formulates the 
theory of the social contract, but also introduces the concept of the “personhood of the state.” 
While there were a few political theorists, like Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf, who expanded 
upon Hobbes’ idea, his theory though was lost throughout political history until modern day 
political philosopher Quentin Skinner took up Hobbes’ argument and attempted to revive it 
within the modern political discourse. Skinner’s lecture, “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial 
Person of the State” is what we will briefly analyze to get a better understanding of what Hobbes 
meant by the personhood of the state.  
 In his lecture, Skinner lays out a very detailed and complete overview of Hobbes’ theory 
about the personhood of the state. For the purposes of this paper, we need not look at ever aspect 
of this argument, but rather we need to focus on one main component which I believe raises 
concern for the argument as a whole: what definition Hobbes gives for a person. After laying out 
the basic elements of Hobbes theory, Skinner cites Hobbes in what his definition of a person is 
and the difference between Natural Persons and Artificial Persons: 
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 “A Person is someone who acts either in his own name or in the name of someone else. 
If he acts in his own name, then the Person is his Own or a Natural One; if he acts in the 
name of someone else, then the person is Representative of the one in whose name he 
acts.”  
In this excerpt from the Latin translation of Leviathan, Hobbes establishes a concept of 
personhood that is defined by whether actions can be attributed to them. If the actions are done 
for and by oneself, then we can call them a Natural Person and if they are done in the name of 
someone else, then they are a Representative, or Artificial Person. This concept is what leads 
Hobbes to further conclude that the state is an Artificial Person, created by the multitude of 
Natural Persons coming together to give power and authority to what he calls the Leviathan.  
 The problem that I see in using this argument for the means of giving moral 
responsibility to the state is the definition that Hobbes gives for a person. Modern moral 
philosophy has seen a surge in theories of personhood, primarily because of the heightened 
social debate over abortion. The concept of personhood has been highly debated and no common 
answer has really been agreed upon within the ethics community. To show just how highly 
controversial this concept is, here is a quick list of some of the leading theories for personhood: 
1. Genetic Theory- You can only be classified as a person if you have the genetic makeup of Homo 
Sapiens 
2. Cognitive Theory- You are a person if you meet certain cognitive criteria like consciousness, 
reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate, and self-awareness   
3. Social Theory- You can be classified as a person if society recognizes you as a person, or if someone 
cares about you 
4. Sentience Theory- You are a person if you have the ability to feel pain and pleasure 
5. Gradient Theory- Personhood is not either you have it or you don’t. It comes in degrees and you can be 
more of a person or less of a person 
I want to make it clear, the fact that there are so many theories about personhood is not what 
makes Hobbes argument for personhood of the state wrong by any means. Rather, the fact there 
are so many competing arguments makes it highly difficult to formulate agreed upon conditions 
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to use for judging whether the state classifies as a person. If we cannot solidly say that the state 
is in fact a person, then our argument for issuing moral responsibility becomes weakened.  For 
this specific question, I believe that we can take a different, much simpler approach by focusing 
on whether or not the state can be classified as a moral agent. 
  While the question of moral agency is still somewhat debated amongst moral 
philosophers, there does seem to be a sentiment that I believe most all would agree to: moral 
agency requires the ability to make moral decisions and judgements based off what is right or 
wrong or good or bad and to be held responsible for these decisions and judgements. One 
specific text that lays out this definition in a much more detailed manner is Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency. In this paper, MacIntyre lays out an 
argument for why the social roles that we create through social structures are harming our idea of 
moral agency. While laying out this argument, MacIntyre also gives us a nice interpretation of 
what a entity must have to be a moral agent. Briefly analyzing this interpretation from MacIntyre 
will give us a better understanding of what capabilities the state must have for us to say it is a 
moral agent.  
 MacIntyre expands upon one main arguments about moral agency that he sees as widely 
shared amongst moral theorist. The first is a conception of what actions moral agents must be 
held justifiably responsible for. MacIntyre says this can takes form in three respects, “First moral 
agents so conceived are justifiably and uncontroversially held responsible for that in their actions 
which is intentional. Secondly, they may be justifiably held responsible for incidental aspects of 
those actions of which they should have been aware. And thirdly they may be justifiably held 
responsible for at least some of the reasonably predictable effects of their actions.” In laying out 
the three ways in which a moral agent should be able to be justifiably responsible for, MacIntyre 
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gives us insight into what it means to be a moral agent. Moral agents are not only held 
accountable for intentional effects from their actions, which seems to be an intuitive idea, but are 
responsible for incidental effects, in which they should be aware, and predictable effects as well. 
Moral agents must have the capability to analyze their actions and decipher between right and 
wrong using some notion of morality. This means that a moral agent should be able to decipher 
the intentional, incidental (to some degree), and predictable effects from their actions. This is 
where the responsibility is generated from.  
 Analyzing the difference between the personhood of the state and the state as a moral 
agent may seem nonessential to my argument as a whole, but I think it is necessary to establish 
the notion that we do not need to be able to call the state a person to be able to hold it morally 
responsible for its actions. Personhood is a very tricky subject and there seems to be no clear 
answer on what standards, if any, must be met to be considered a person. Moral agency, on the 
other hand, seems to at least have a common notion that most moral philosophers can agree 
upon, and it will get us to the same goal of being able to assign moral responsibility to states. 
Based off of this, it seems intuitive, for the sake of the argument, to attempt to argue that we can 
consider states to be moral agents rather than a person.  
Thinking of States as Moral Agents  
Holding states morally accountable as collective agents has been a contentious stance 
within the realm of international political philosophy, but it seems that current literature has been 
leaning towards an agential theory of collective morality. Many philosophers within international 
political philosophy have contributed to this theory, which means there are several iterations of 
how the theory is laid out. I have chosen to use Philip Pettit’s version of an agential theory that 
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he lays out in his article, Responsibility Incorporated. In this piece, Pettit establishes three 
conditions that test the “fitness” of a group to be held responsible in a richer since of the word 
than just causally or legally responsible. Pettit is running an argument that I believe shows that 
collective agents, like states, can be held morally responsible, and, therefore be counted as moral 
agents. I will lay out and explore this theory more in this section, but first I want to briefly 
explore what the agential theory looks like, and what establishing a theory of moral agency for 
collective entities allows us to do.  
 Like I stated earlier, there are several iterations of the agential theory, but the main crux 
of the argument goes something like this. Humans are considered moral agents because of 
certain criteria that we believe are required to be able to hold one morally accountable for their 
actions and choices. These criteria vary in different iterations of the theory, but they typically 
include the ability to have intentions and the ability to deliberate on one’s actions. The agential 
theory says that we can hold collective agents morally accountable in the same way that we can 
individual agents because they meet these same criteria, and therefore, we can consider them to 
be moral agents. This theory shifts how we have traditionally thought about moral responsibility. 
Most of the mainstream moral theories deal explicitly with individual actors and tend to not think 
of collective agents as moral actors. Unlike today, where we see millions of collective agents like 
states and corporations making decisions all the time, these moral theories were created in a time 
with a lot fewer collective agents to worry about. It is for this exact reason that I believe 
collective agents were not thought about often in the realm of moral philosophy, and why I 
believe it is now necessary that we start to include them in modern discussions of moral 
responsibility. An agential theory allows us to do that.  
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 Pettit lays out the agential theory in a way that I believe not only effectively establishes 
the necessary analogy between individual actors and collective agents to show moral agency, but 
also shows how holding collective agents morally responsible is something we should want if we 
want to hold actors fully accountable for their actions. The argument for the theory is laid out by 
first establishing three conditions that Pettit says must be met to show the fitness of a group for 
being held responsible. These conditions are: 
1. “Value relevance- The group is an autonomous agent that faces a significant choice 
between doing something good or bad or right or wrong. 
2. Value judgement- The group has the understanding and the access to evidence 
required for making judgements about the relative value of such options. 
3.  Value sensitivity- The group has the control required for being able to choose 
between the options on the basis of its judgements about their respective values.” 
These criteria given by Pettit are similar to those typically given in most agential theories. 
However, Pettit’s argument is particularly interesting because he puts a focus on the value that is 
associated with decisions making. The first criterion tells us that the group is facing a value-
relevant choice where the group can choose to do something good or bad. The second tells us 
that the group can make judgements on the value of their choices. Finally, the third one tells us 
that the group can make a choice based off its own respective values. This talk of value is what 
sets apart this type of responsibility from that simple coming from causal or even legal. I believe 
this value that Pettit focuses on has to do with morality and therefore, makes the responsibility 
generated from these criteria moral ones. Establishing this, thus gives us reason to believe that 
collective agents are moral agents.  
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Pettit spends the rest of his paper detailing his argument as to why collective agents meet these 
three conditions and are therefore fit for moral responsibility.(footnote needed here)  Instead of 
going in depth into the argument presented by Pettit, I am going to assume the three conditions 
are true and analyze how “states”, specifically, relate to these three conditions, starting with the 
value relevance condition. In short, to meet the condition of value relevance, the group, in this 
case the state, must be a) an autonomous agent who b) faces choices between good and bad and 
right and wrong. Like Pettit states in his paper, we can assume the state is will face choices 
between good and bad and right and wrong if we find evidence that they are an autonomous 
agent because if you are an autonomous agent, you will face choices and it is highly likely that 
those choices will have options that have good and bad moral worth. Therefore, we need not 
spend any time on condition b because it will follow from condition a. To find evidence that the 
state can be an autonomous agent, we first understand what it means to be autonomous.  
The most common understanding for an agent to be autonomous is for them to have the 
capacity for self-determination of one’s actions and choices. For example, we think of most 
autonomous humans as being able to determine their actions and choices through their own free 
will and not because of an exterior force telling them what to do. When we think of the state, we 
usually think of a group of individuals who make up that state. Whether it be a republic or 
oligarchy, the choices of the state are usually made by its members. Some may say that this 
means the state’s choices and actions are not autonomous, because they are decided not by the 
state, but rather the members who make up the state. However, it seems like this doubt can be 
rebutted if there exist a choice or action that can’t be reduced to the choices of the individual 
actors. Petit gives us an example showing that it is possible for a group entity to make a choice, 
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while at the same time, none of the members having that same choice. I will give one similar 
example but change it so that it fits with our analysis of the state.  
Imagine with me for a moment that we live in a small oligarchic republic where a four-
member council is the state apparatus. This council is deciding on whether or not to enact a 
universal healthcare system for its citizens. They decide that if they are to enact such a policy, it 
must meet all of a set of 4 criteria that they have decided upon. Each member cast their vote on 












Criterion A Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Criterion B Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Criterion C Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Criterion D No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Members 
Decision  
No No No No  
 
After the revealing the results, the policy is enacted because there was a majority consensus that 
the policy met each criterion. However, each member’s individual decision was to not enact the 
policy because each member felt it didn’t meet one of the criteria. Like in Pettit’s example, we 
have revealed an example where it seems that the decision of the group can not be reduced to any 
of its members individual decision. This example seems to make it impossible to say exactly who 
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or what holds the responsibility for the decision to enact the policy, given the guidelines. One 
answer could be that the decision came from the group, as a whole. No individual actor can be 
said to have enacted the policy, rather we can say that the state enacted the policy. This seems to 
be a enough evidence to make the claim that the state is an autonomous agent, because it has the 
capability of making self-determined choices like the one shown above.  
The next condition that Pettit talks about is Value Judgement which test whether an agent 
can make analyze evidence and make judgements on the relative value of the options it is given. 
It seems to me that we need not spend too much time on this condition. In regard to the state, the 
main question here is whether it can make judgements about the options it faces when making 
decisions. The reason I say that we need not spend much time talking about this condition is 
because we see states making judgements about propositions all the time. For example, in the 
U.S. Congress, legislation, which represent options for how to go about a certain issue, are 
brought up for consideration on a constant basis. Votes are held by the chambers of congress to 
formally decide on the value of said legislation and these votes are decided on by a deep analysis 
of the evidence provided in support and against legislation. Though this process, the state is able 
to make a judgement on any propositions that are made by its members, and thus the state’s 
value judgment is formed. This is just a formalized way in which the state makes a judgement on 
the value of options it is given. This example seems to have easily mad the case for the state to, 
meet the second condition needed to be held responsible for its choices, but it won’t be this 
simple for the third condition.  
Pettit’s third condition is Value sensitivity and it is the one that seems to be the most 
troublesome for collective agents. To meet this condition, the group agent must be able to make 
choices between options based of its judgements of its own respective values. Pettit makes it 
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clear in his paper, “given that the group agent is able to form judgements on the relative value of 
different options, the question is whether it can make choices in response to those judgements: 
whether it can be duly sensitive to the reasons that the judgements provide.” To be able to 
address this problem adequately, I believe we need to follow along with Pettit’s argument as to 
why group agents meet this condition, with keeping in mind that we are specifically focused on 
the state as our group agent. At first glance, one may make the claim that all decisions made by 
the state are decisions intentionally made by individuals with reason sensitive control, on behalf 
of the state. Like Pettit says, this statement runs us into a problem because it seems to say that 
the state as a separate agent is not able to be in intentional, reason sensitive control of its actions, 
but rather only the individuals who make up the state can. Pettit sums up the problem that we 
face in meeting the third condition in the following argument:  
“Whatever a group agent does is done by individual agents.  
Individuals are in reason-sensitive control of anything that they do and so in control of 
anything they do in acting for a group. 
One and the same action cannot be subject both to the reason-sensitive control of the 
group agent and to the reason-sensitive control of one or more individuals. 
Hence, the group agent cannot be in reason-sensitive control of what it does; such control 
always rest with the individuals who act for the group.”  
Since this argument is valid and Pettit says we must look at the soundness of each premise, 
specifically the third premise, because throughout the entire paper, Pettit has been running on the 
assumption that the first two premises given are sound. So, the question we must answer is 
whether an action can be subject to the reason-sensitive control of both individual agents and the 
group at the same time.  
 To answer this question, Pettit gives us an example of a flask of water being brought to a 
boil, and, consequently, the flask breaks. In this scenario, the flask breaks because a water 
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molecule within the flask reaches a point of momentum that is sufficient enough to break the 
molecular bond of the flask. We then need to ask the question of what makes the flask break. On 
one level, we can say that the flask breaks because of the molecule that triggered the break. 
However, on another level, we can also say that the boiling of the water is also causally relevant. 
Pettit sees this as a higher and lower levels of causality. “The higher-level event, the water being 
at the boiling point, programs for the collapse of the flask, and the lower-level event implements 
that program by actually producing the break.” In this excerpt, Pettit introduces the idea of the 
programing agent and the implementing agent. Using this as an analogy for group and individual 
actors, we can say that the individual agents within the group are the ones charged with 
implementing the choices and actions made. The group, itself, is what programs the choices and 
actions that are to be made. Both of these agents seem to have causal relevance to the end 
actions. Pettit fleshes this idea out by saying, “The members will have responsibility as enactors 
of the corporate deed, so far as they could have refused to play that part and didn’t. The group 
agent as a whole will have responsibility as the source of the deed: the ultimate, reason-sensitive 
planner of its origin.” This idea of programing and implementing is what Pettit believes gives 
both group agents and individual agents value-sensitive control over actions, and, therefore, the 
opportunity for group agents to meet the third condition. 
    After seeing Pettit’s defense for group agents meeting the third condition, lets now look 
at how the state fits into this idea of programming and implementing. The simplest example of 
this process that comes to mind is again the U.S. government. The state apparatus of the United 
States consists of three branches of government: The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. These 
three branches all play a role in performing the actions of the state. When legislation is passed in 
the Legislature, signed by the President, and then upheld by the Supreme Court, it then becomes 
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the law of the land and therefore a decision has been made by the state. This is what we can refer 
to as the higher-level, programming apparatus of the actions taken by the state. Within all three 
of these branches are individual actors, the President and his cabinet, Representatives and 
Senators, and Justices, who act on behalf of the state. These individuals are the implementing 
apparatus of the state. They have a causal relationship to the actions taken by the state in the 
form of voting and to some extent caucusing for certain proposals. Just like in Pettit’s example, 
the individuals have responsibility as enactors of policy, but the state as a whole will have 
responsibility as the source of the action: “the ultimate, reason-sensitive planner at its origin.”  
 Actions taken made by the state have moral implications towards their citizens and other 
state actors, so it seems intuitive to me that they should hold some sort of responsibility for these 
actions. Through Pettit’s argument, it becomes quite clear there is good reason to believe that 
collective agents like the state meet the provided conditions to be held morally responsible for 
these actions. Pettit talks about the need for holding groups responsible in this way in the last 
section of his paper. If we can’t hold collective agents morally responsible, we take the risk of 
running into situations where no individual actor within the group can’t be held responsible for 
the action, and therefore, we have nowhere to place the responsibility. When dealing with 
collective agents with the amount of power that states have, it seems intuitively obvious that we 
would not want to let states be able to act without having to take responsibility for those actions. 
Using an agential theory for collective agents helps us avoid these issues all together.   
 
What does a Virtue Ethics framework give us?  
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 Now that we have established that the state is a moral agent who can be held morally 
responsible for its actions, we can move forward with formulating a positive case for using 
Virtue Ethics to make moral claims about state actions and choices. Before we do that, however, 
it would seem beneficial to give a quick overview of the basics of Virtue Ethics to better 
understand how we will apply this moral theory, which is inherently focused on individuals, to a 
collective moral agent like the state. After a brief overview of Virtue Ethics, I will then go into 
what I call Virtues of the State. These are virtues that the state can embody, cultivate, and strive 
towards in its actions within the domestic sphere. While I do believe that one could make a case 
for a variety of virtues, I will focus on three that I believe are the most relevant to the issues of 
today that require state action. These three are Justice, Equality, and Compassion. To provide an 
analysis of how these three virtues could be embodied and cultivated by the state, I will look at 
current issues with the United States and how the state apparatus of the U.S. has acted on these 
issues. Through this analysis, I believe we will not be able to make moral claims on the actions 
taken by the U.S. state apparatus and others, but also lay groundwork for establishing what a 
Virtuous State would look like.  
The theory behind Virtue Ethics was first introduced by Aristotle in his collection of 
books called The Ethics. In book 2 titled “Moral Virtue,” Aristotle introduces the concept that for 
a person to reach what he called eudaimonia, translated as “human flourishing,” a person must 
work towards cultivating the virtues and act virtuously in all aspects of life.  For a person to act 
virtuous, for Aristotle, they must be performing the action in between two extremes. This is what 
Aristotle calls the “golden mean.” For example, acting courageous is the midpoint between 
acting cowardice, which is a deficiency, and acting reckless, which is too excessive. Aristotle 
says on page 46 of The Ethics, “Virtue, then, has to deal with feelings or passions and with 
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outward acts, in which excess is wrong and deficiency also is blamed, but the mean amount is 
praised and is right- both of which are characteristics of virtue.” Simply put, a virtuous person 
means doing the right thing, at the right time, in the right way, in the right amount, and to the 
right people.  
Aristotle makes it clear that the virtues are not implanted within the nature of humans, but 
rather humans must acquire them and cultivate them by acting with the intent of being better and 
learning from other, more virtuous, people. Using experiences and watching other virtuous 
people is the only way to learn how to make virtuous choices. Aristotle relates this process to 
how builders and harpist learn their art. He says on page 35 of The Ethics, “But the virtues we 
acquire by doing the acts, as is the case with the arts too. We learn an art by doing that which we 
wish to do when we have learned it; we become builders by building, and harpers by harping. 
And by doing just acts we become just, and by doing acts of temperance and courage we become 
temperate and courageous.”  Also, a true virtuous person is never finished learning. They always 
have improvements to make because they are gaining new experiences that teach them how to be 
even more virtuous. To be a fully virtuous person you cannot only cultivate some of the virtues, 
you have to cultivate all of them. To be truly virtuous you must act in a way that creates a unity 
between all the virtues. Performing and acting in this way is what makes moral, virtuous people 
out of humanity.  
 Reading this short description of what Virtue Theory is, one may raise the concern that 
this moral theory was created for individuals and cannot be applied to collective agents like the 
state. While I do understand these worries, I believe that they are simply barriers for virtue 
theorists that prevent them from being able to make moral claims within the field of global 
justice. All the way back to its origins, Virtue Ethics has been a theory about people interacting 
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with other people in their communities. These everyday encounters with others in the community 
are what Aristotle says aid in the cultivation of a person’s virtues. The cultivation of an 
individual’s virtue in the community also adds to the joint goal of the community, which is 
becoming more virtuous overall. To Aristotle, these interactions are heavily grounded in real one 
on one connections between human beings and humans achieving their final end, or “function”. 
Throughout, The Ethics, he emphasizes that cultivating the virtues and becoming a virtuous 
person is all for the sole purpose of attaining eudaimonia and happiness for one’s life. After 
reading all of that, it seems clear that Aristotle would have chuckled at the notion of taking a 
moral theory that was specifically designed for human beings and applying it to non-tangible 
states that have no need, or even capability, of reaching eudaimonia and feeling happiness.  
Despite the creator of the theory most likely disagreeing with me on this issue, I still hold 
that we must find a way to advance past the “humans only” view in Virtue Ethics. First off, I do 
not feel that it is necessary for me to address the fact that collective entities cannot achieve 
eudaimonia or feel happiness. While this is considered the purpose for humans to work towards 
cultivating the virtues, it does not seem to be a requirement for them to take part in the practice. 
It seems totally plausible that a person could take part in cultivating virtues without wanting to 
gain happiness or eudaimonia. To be able to apply this theory to collective agents like the state, I 
believe all that is necessary is to show that states are capable of performing the same necessary 
moral interactions that individuals do to cultivate their virtues, and that states meet the 
requirements for being a moral agent. Since I have already accomplished this in the prior 
sections, I think we are safe to move forward.  
Justice is the first virtue that I believe states can cultivate within their actions towards 
their citizens. The definition of justice that I believe best fits for what we are concerned about in 
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this paper comes from Aristotle himself. In Book 5 of the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle writes, 
“A just thing then will be (1) that which is in accordance with the law, (2) that which is fair; and 
the unjust thing will be (1) that which is contrary to law, (2) that which is unfair.” Now when 
Aristotle was talking about justice, he of course wasn’t writing about how the state can cultivate 
this virtue, but rather how a person can. However, I still think we can pull from this definition 
and see how the state can accomplish the same thing. From this definition of justice from 
Aristotle, I think we should focus on the fairness part rather than the law-abiding part. While I do 
think that states can follow and break laws just like a person can, international law for example, I 
think when we look at the domestic sphere and the interactions of states with their citizens, we 
should pay particular mind to whether they are fair and just with their actions. If a state, as a 
moral actor, has cultivated the virtue of justice, then we should be able to see the characteristics 
of justice in the actions that the state takes.  
To be able to make a moral claim about a states’ cultivation of the virtue of justice, we 
must look at their actions taken towards citizens and ask two questions. Were the effects of this 
action deserved and, if so, were they equitably distributed? These questions speak to the fairness 
and justness of the action taken. To further analyze this state virtue of justice let’s take a look at 
an example from the United States. In 1970, the U.S. Congress passed the Controlled Substance 
Act which gave marijuana a schedule one drug classification. This classification has led to the 
mass incarceration of U.S. citizens who are caught smoking or in possession marijuana. This 
action taken by the United States has changed the lives of its citizens in horrible ways. With the 
addition of other laws like the three strikes law, some citizens have been sentenced to life in 
prison for simply possessing a small amount of weed or failing a drug test during probation. The 
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effects of this action taken by the U.S. government are moral ones and thus we can judge them 
and see if they are in line with the virtue of justice.  
Like I stated earlier, the first question we must ask is whether the effects of these actions 
were deserved. To answer this question, we must understand why the law was necessary in the 
first place. If the use of marijuana led to horrible effects within the community, then it seems 
justified that the U.S. government ban the use of it and implement repercussions to deter citizens 
from using the substance. Thus, the effects of these repercussions on their citizens would be 
deserved because the law was put in place to solve a more troubling problem. However, this was 
not the case. There is no evidence that shows marijuana use increases the likely hood of violence 
amongst its users and actually there are studies that allude to the exact opposite like this one 
from a 2013 Rand Corporation Study that says  "marijuana use does not induce violent crime, 
and the links between marijuana use and property crime are thin.” This would seem to say that 
there was no actual reason for the law to be put in place, and therefore, no justification for the 
effects of the repercussions that U.S. citizens faced for breaking this law. In this specific case, 
the actions taken by the U.S. created effects for its citizens that were not deserved.  Since this 
action clearly goes against the question of whether or not the effects were deserved, it is not 
necessary that we venture into the question of whether or not they were equitably distributed. 
However, I do think it is relevant to point out that studies from the ACLU show that even though 
blacks and whites use marijuana at roughly the same rate, blacks are four times more likely to be 
arrested for marijuana possession than whites. This just provides further evidence that these 
actions taken by the U.S. do not show a cultivation of the state virtue of justice.   
The next virtue that we are going to analyze is Equality. The concept of equality has been 
theorized by many different people to mean many different things. The type of equality that I 
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want to talk about here is that to do with democratic equality of citizens within a state. This 
concept of democratic equality is famously created by Elizabeth Anderson in What is the Point 
of Equality. In this paper Anderson says, “to be capable of functioning as an equal citizen 
involves the ability to effectively exercise specifically political rights, but also to participate in 
the various activities of civil society more broadly, including participation in the economy. And 
functioning in these ways presupposes functioning as a human being. Consider, the, three aspects 
of individual functioning: as a human being, as a participant in a system of cooperative 
production, and as a citizen of a democratic state.” This type of equality is what should be 
promoted by the actions of the state and thus created for its citizens. When looking at whether a 
state has cultivated this virtue of equality, we should look at the systems that the state has put in 
place to promote the capability to function as an equal citizen. If these systems produce a true 
form of equality than we can say that the state has acted in a virtuous way, and if not than they 
we can say the opposite.  
To provide an example for the cultivation of this virtue, let’s look at a part of U.S. history 
that many want to forget, slavery. The U.S. had slavery as an official part of its society all the 
way up until the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation was signed by President Abraham 
Lincoln in 1863. This act by the U.S. state apparatus granted legal status to over 3 million slaves 
across the country. One does not have to dive too deep into the concept of slavery to understand 
that this institution blatantly goes against the concept of equality that we are analyzing. Slavery 
allows for the owing of human beings as property and prohibits these individuals from being able 
to do take part in the basic functions of being a human that Anderson described when talking 
about equality. The actions taken to allow slavery to exist in the U.S. were clearly and 
definitively not virtuous in any way. With that being said, the U.S. did take the right action and 
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abolished slavery. Since that time, the state has implemented many policies like the Civil Rights 
Act in 1964 and others to improve the social standing of those affected by slavery and racism. 
These actions, in and of themselves, seem to be rooted in the concept of equality for all citizens. 
The actions taken by the U.S. to implement policies that would increase the capability for black 
people to function in society equally with whites are ones that I would say show that the U.S. has 
worked to cultivate the virtue of equality. Now this is not to say that the U.S. is perfect in this 
aspect. The U.S. still has laws that negatively affect groups of citizens in way that do not 
promote equality. However, just like the actions of individuals can never be perfectly virtuous, 
only more or less virtuous, so can the actions of the state.  
The last virtue that I wanted to analyze in this paper was that of Compassion. This virtue 
seems to have a slightly more agreed upon definition than the other two. For most, to be 
compassionate means to show sympathy for the suffering of others. We as individual actors 
exemplify this virtue when we donate to the poor and provide comfort to those suffering. The 
state can exemplify this virtue through the actions it takes towards those citizens worst off in 
society. Cultivating this virtue means that the actions taken by the state show sympathy and work 
to alleviate the struggles of its citizens who suffer the most. This would include policies that deal 
with homelessness, poverty, and to some extent, healthcare. This last issue of healthcare is the 
one that I want to dive deeper into to see how the U.S. does or does not show compassion to its 
citizens who suffer from health problems.  
The U.S. healthcare system may be one of the most complicated systems in the world. It 
is a mostly privatized system that relies on employees receiving health insurance from their 
employers. It also has public aspects like Medicare and Medicaid that help supply health 
insurance for those who are retired or in poverty. However, these systems still leave close to 44 
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million uninsured and many more with inadequate insurance. Co-pays, deductibles, and 
premiums make private health insurance incredibly expensive and put some people in massive 
debt for simply getting hurt or having a pre-existing condition. Interestingly enough, the U.S. is 
actually one of the only countries on the world where people actually go bankrupt because of 
unpaid medical bills. So, on top of having to struggle with the medical emergency you were 
handed, you also have to deal with massive debt that comes with treating it. On the surface of 
this issue, I think any reasonable person can see the lack of compassion that exist within this 
system.  Instead of the U.S. providing healthcare for all of its citizens regardless of their ability 
to pay, they let the private industry make massive profit off people getting injured. The policies 
passed and the actions taken by the U.S. to allow for this to happen lack the virtue of compassion 
in ever sense of the word and are downright immoral.   
The few virtues that I have laid out in this paper are far from all the ones that a state, as a 
moral actor, should work towards cultivating and embodying, but they are ones that I feel are 
most important to talk about at this current moment in history. Justice, Equality, and Compassion 
seem to be lacking in not just the U.S. state apparatus, but many others across the world. This is 
why I believe it is important for us to be able to see states as moral actors and judge their actions 
through a moral framework. If we can see the actions of the state towards its citizens as 
inherently moral ones, then we can make claims about their lack for morality and the need for 
them to be corrected. Along with this ability to make moral clams about a state’s actions, through 
Virtue Theory we can also conceive of a Virtuous State, just like Aristotle conceives of a 
virtuous person. A Virtuous State is one that act in accordance with the virtues. They work on 
cultivating the virtues and implementing them in their policy decisions and actions towards their 
citizens. This idea of a Virtuous State can serve as a moral exemplar for other states to strive 
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towards. This strategy puts a guiding morality at the focal point of states actions and removes the 
current metric of sheer power. Now a state is judged on how it has cultivated the virtues, rather 
than how successful they have been in gaining power over other states. This idea would 
hopefully lead to a more moral world for all people living in it.    
Application: Is Choosing Capitalism Virtuous? 
 So now I ask the question, would it be virtuous for the state to choose Capitalism as its 
economic system? At first it may seem weird to say that any state “chooses” the economic 
system that is used within its society; however, I believe that this choices comes about in the 
actions that any state takes towards structuring its economic system. The rules and regulations 
passed by the governments of states play a key role in what economic system is allowed to take 
root in its society. Every day, that state allows, or chooses, to let one economic system prevail 
over others. In saying this, I want to look at how virtuous it is for a state to choose capitalism as 
its economic system. Now I do understand that economic systems are tricky to talk about 
because they can implement aspects from other economic systems that may make it hard to call it 
simply just a capitalist system. Therefore, I believe it is better to focus on the theory of 
competition, which I believe to be a cornerstone concept of capitalism.  
In this section, I will look at this theory of competition and analyze how it effects the 
three virtues of the state that I expanded upon in the section prior. I will show how capitalism 
and the theory of competition do not promote the virtues of the state, but rather promote vices 
like injustice instead of justice, indifference instead of compassion, and inequality instead of 
equality. Through this application of my theory, I believe that I can successfully critique 
capitalism on moral grounds without calling capitalism itself immoral. While I may believe that 
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capitalism itself is immoral, I do recognize that the rebuttal to this line of reasoning is that 
capitalism can’t be immoral because economic systems are neither moral nor immoral, but rather 
amoral. The approach that I intend to take with this section is to say that the choice of having 
capitalism is an immoral choice made by the state who chooses it. Therefore, the burden of 
immorality is given to the state and not on the system of capitalism itself. I believe that this is an 
adequate work around to the rebuttal given by many economists and gives reason to believe that 
capitalism is not a moral economic system for states to have in their societies.  
Before I go into how the theory of competition prevents states from acting virtuously, we 
must first provide a definition to the theory of competition. There are different iterations of this 
theory, but I will be using one of the most know theories presented by Adam Smith in his work, 
Wealth of Nations. In the Wealth of Nations, Smith talks extensively about the many aspects of a 
capitalist economy and says this about competition, “If this capital is divided between two 
different grocers, their competition will tend to make both of them sell cheaper, than if it were in 
the hands of one only: and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just so 
much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order to raise the price, just so 
much less.” This is the basic notion of the theory of competition. The creation of competition and 
a free market are supposed to lower the prices of goods for consumers and thus provided more 
goods, at an affordable price, to more people, rathe than if all of the goods were owned and sold 
by one company. This is the basic notion for competition in an economical sense but lets expand 
upon this and see what this means for other aspects of our society.  
 When you talk about competition in simple terms like lemonade stands, it seems harmless 
and honestly seems like a good thing for consumers. Surely lower priced goods would be a good 
thing for people who fall into the lower income bracket of that society. However, one thing that 
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we don’t focus on enough is how this theory of competition has made its way into other aspects 
of our society. When we talk about competition, we have to acknowledge that competition has 
embedded itself in the American way of life. If you want to be successful in this country, you 
have to do better than everyone else in your workplace, in your school, or in your community. 
The theory of competition makes our society a battleground where everyone is fighting against 
each other to be more successful than the others. By no means do I think that wanting to be 
successful is a bad thing in any way. However, this sense of complete competition within our 
society creates a society that is completely outcome driven and the outcome that matters is all 
centered around profit. This is where I believe that the problem arises with the theory of 
competition and its relation to how a state can be virtuous.  
The first virtue that I want to look at is justice. Like I have provided earlier in this paper, 
my definition of justice comes from Aristotle, with a particular focus on the fairness within the 
actions taken by the state towards its citizens.  The question that we must answer is: how does 
competition and profit motive effect the ability of the state being just and fair to its citizens. To 
answer this question, we will look at how competition and profit motive have affected the 
incarceration system in the United States. The U.S. not only has the world’s largest prison 
population, but also the world’s largest private prison population. A lot of these private prisons 
are owned by corporations that run these facilities as for-profit prisons. The private prison 
market has seen a major jump in the proportion of total prisoners they keep in the last 20 years. 
In one study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the amount of the total prisoners that were held 
in private prisons jumped up 47% from 2000 to 2016 and the number of immigrants held in 
privately owned detention centers also jumped up 442% from 2002 to 2017. These increases 
have led to a massive profit haul for the CEOs of these companies. According to the sentencing 
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project, an organization fighting against for-profit prisons, “Core Civic and its closest 
competitor, GEO Group, collectively manage over half of the private corrections contracts in the 
United States, with combined revenues of $3.5 billion in 2015.” This massive profit motive and 
competition between these companies has created a criminal justice system in America that 
makes money off of the more people we put into prison. This seems to be contradictory to the 
reason you have a criminal justice system in the first place and does not promote justice and 
fairness within society. When your economic system is based off of competition every sector 
becomes focused by the amount of profit that one can make out of the system. This means that 
enough profit can always outweigh the importance of justice with any society and shows how 
competition and profit motive prevents states from exemplifying the virtue of justice.  
The next virtue is that of equality and the ability to function “as a human being, as a 
participant in a system of cooperative production, and as a citizen of a democratic state.” The 
problem that competition brings to the virtue of equality comes about through the results that 
competition brings about within a society. Competition produces winners and losers and once 
this happens you start to see a divide in wealth between those who win and those who lose. 
Granted, one may say that this divide is justified because the winner worked harder than the loser 
to win the competition. However, we must look at the starting places of these winners and 
analyze whether they have been given an advantage in the competition. A lot of people in 
America like to tout that anyone can become a billionaire and that these individuals earned their 
way to the top through the competition that capitalism provides. However, I believe this claim is 
not a correct way to describe the wealth that has been accumulated by those in the 1% of 
America. A study by United for a Fair Economy showed that “roughly 40% of the [Forbes 400] 
2011 list received a significant advantage by inheriting a sizeable asset from a spouse or family 
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member [and] more than 20% received sufficient wealth to make the list from their inheritance 
alone.” These numbers show that the success of the richest individuals in America tends comes 
from inheritance and privileged positions, not hard work through competition. This massive 
accumulation of wealth also gives these individuals unlimited resources to buy whatever is 
necessary to keep “winning” the competition within the economy. This puts the majority of 
Americans at a disadvantage to ever be a winner. The true problem that I see in these outcomes 
is not that they exist, but rather that they are inevitable. Competition always leads to winners and 
losers, and those winners will always have an advantage over those that lose. This leads to an 
unequal society where those who have the resources to succeed in competition will always win 
the competition. To promote equality, you must provide all people with the means to succeed 
and in a society where the majority of those resources are in the hands of 1% of the population, 
this cannot happen. 
The final virtue is that of compassion and how we treat those worst off in our society. 
Competition works very well in things like sports where the losers can still go home to their 
families and enjoy their lives outside of the competition that they lost. This, however, is not the 
reality when the competition decides where you go home to sleep at night. The losers in our 
society do not simply lose a game, they lose their livelihood and in some cases their lives. A 
study by Columbia University found that “approximately 245,000 deaths in the United States in 
the year 2000 were attributable to low levels of education, 176,000 to racial segregation, 162,000 
to low social support, 133,000 to individual-level poverty, 119,000 to income inequality, and 
39,000 to area-level poverty.” These individuals lost the “competition” that proponents of 
capitalism tout so much about, and then also lost their lives because they could not afford the 
basic necessities that human beings need to live. To analyze whether a state is being 
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compassionate with its actions towards its citizens, we must look at how they treat those worst 
off in their society, and for America, it seems they have left them to die. I am not saying that this 
is an inevitable effect of competition, nor am I saying that these problems could not be fixed by a 
social safety net put in place to help these individuals. However, I am saying that it makes no 
sense to allow an economic system that produces these effects to exist in the first place. 
Allowing a system that results in the death of those worst off in your society is morally wrong 
and prevents the state from acting compassionate to its citizens.   
Capitalism has produced a lot of wealth for states and the people who are on top in these 
state’s economies. However, we should not judge a state on how much money it has, but rather 
how virtuous it acts to its citizens. Capitalism leads to injustices across a state’s society, 
inequality amongst its people, and zero compassion for those worst off. This is because 
capitalism is not people focused, but rather profit focused through competition. I will not venture 
into a discussion about what economic system a state should choose if it wants to right the wrong 
of allowing capitalism to ransack its society, that can be discussed in other essays. However, I 
will say that the implementation and the continuation of capitalism as the economic system of 
any state will prevent that state from ever being able to act in a virtuous to its citizens. 
Conclusion 
 Abuses of human rights and massive injustices are prevalent around the world. The main 
purveyors of these struggles are the state apparatuses that choose to allow this to keep going on. 
Whether it is allowing for the massive accumulation of wealth by a few individuals or allowing 
workers to be exploited across the world, states are the ones who make these decisions and take 
these actions. We must figure out some way to hold these actors morally responsible so that we 
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can begin the process for correcting these wrongs. The theory that I lay out in this paper will not 
fix every problem that we see in the world, but rather it is a starting place. If we can begin to 
look at states as moral actors, then we can begin to judge their actions through a moral 
framework. This may not seem like such a big deal, but I would challenge that it would be a 
paradigm shift like never seen before. Instead of the metric for state success being focused 
around power, it will instead be focused around morality. If we effectively utilize Virtue Theory 
in a way that will allow us to not only make moral claims about the actions taken by states but 
also create virtues and moral exemplars for states to use as a guide, then I believe we will 
successfully change the narrative that has brought so much misery and pain to a majority of the 
world’s population.  
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